Technical Brief
Pulse Agentic AI Extension
Continuous Authorization for Human-Anchored Agentic Workflows
Extending human-anchored continuous trust to autonomous AI agents — from initiation to the last authorized action.
Pulse Continuous Authentication | affirmedid.com | April 2026
Executive Summary
Pulse Continuous Authentication establishes a foundational principle: security is not a gate at login — it is a continuous, living signal tied to the verified presence and identity of a human user. As organizations deploy agentic AI systems that operate autonomously for extended periods, a critical security gap emerges: the human who authorized the workflow may no longer be actively engaged, yet the automated activity proceeds without any ongoing verification of the originating principal.
The Pulse Agentic AI Extension bridges this gap. By anchoring every agentic session to the continuous authentication state of the initiating human — enforced through a tightly integrated OIDC/OAuth 2 + AuthZEN + PDP/PEP framework — Pulse extends the same trust guarantees that protect human sessions to the autonomous agents operating in their name. When the human's trust degrades or their ClientMaster session terminates, the entire agentic chain responds immediately and automatically.
Core Value Proposition: Human responsibility for agentic activity does not end when the human steps away — Pulse ensures it cannot. Every agentic action is traceable, bounded, and continuously authorized against a live human trust signal. Security parity between actively engaged users and their delegated agentic workflows.
The Security Challenge: Agentic AI Without Human Continuity
Traditional authentication frameworks were designed for human sessions. A user logs in, performs actions, and logs out. The session lifecycle is predictable and relatively short. Agentic AI fundamentally changes this model:
- Agents may operate for hours or days without human interaction
- A single human authorization can spawn dozens of sub-agents with cascading permissions
- Agents access sensitive resources, execute transactions, and modify systems autonomously
- The human who initiated the workflow may be unavailable, asleep, or have had their credentials compromised after launch
- Existing session tokens provide static authorization that cannot reflect changes in the human's trust state
| Traditional Agentic Security Model | Pulse Agentic Extension Model |
|---|---|
| Point-in-time authorization at agent launch | Continuous authorization linked to live human trust signal |
| Session token passed to agent — valid until expiry | Agent authorizations expire when human session degrades |
| No awareness of human presence after initiation | Real-time propagation of trust changes through agent chain |
| Agent continues even if human credentials are revoked | Immediate suspension on human session termination |
| Sub-agents inherit tokens without re-validation | Sub-agent spawning requires validated parent authorization |
| Audit trail links to token, not verified human identity | Complete Merkle-anchored audit trail to cryptographic agent identity |
Architectural Foundation
1. The ClientMaster: Human Presence as the Root of Trust
At the core of the Pulse Agentic Extension is the ClientMaster — the OIDC client session that binds the authenticated human to the agentic ecosystem. The ClientMaster is not merely an authentication record; it is the continuous, live proof of human presence and accountability.
- The human authenticates to the ClientMaster using Passkey (FIDO2) or the AffirmedID Auth app, establishing a dual-assertion identity baseline
- The Auth app continuously streams Identity, Proximity, 3D Location, and Device Health trust metrics to the Pulse PDP throughout the ClientMaster session
- All agentic sessions inherit their authority from the ClientMaster — they share its ClientID and cannot outlive it
- If the ClientMaster session terminates for any reason — logout, trust threshold breach, device compromise, proximity violation — all subordinate agentic sessions terminate immediately via PEP push notification
Technical Benefit — Accountability Without Active Engagement: Human responsibility persists by design, not policy. Because agentic operations are structurally coupled to the ClientMaster, the human cannot delegate authority and then disclaim it. The session record, the trust metrics, and the cryptographic agent identities create an unbroken chain of accountability from human to action — even when hours or days elapse between initiation and execution.
2. Agentic Identity: Cryptographic Accountability with SHA-256/SHA-512
Each agentic instance receives a unique AgenticID — a cryptographic hash (SHA-256 or SHA-512) derived from a context tuple that establishes its provenance and relationships. The resolved context elements contributing to the AgenticID hash are:
- The specific agentic instance parameters (role, scope, invocation context)
- The ClientMaster instance identifier at time of spawn
- The parent agentic instance identifier (for spawned sub-agents)
- A time-bounded session window — the valid operational time range for this agent instance, baked into the hash at creation. An agent whose session window has elapsed carries an identity that no longer matches any valid authorization record, making expired agents cryptographically distinguishable from active ones without a separate revocation lookup.
- A timestamp and nonce to prevent replay and hash collision
The AgenticID hash provides multiple security properties simultaneously:
- Immutability: the identity of any agentic instance is fixed at creation and cannot be altered
- Provenance: the hash encodes the chain of delegation from human to ClientMaster to agent
- Non-repudiation: every action taken by an agent is attributable to a specific, cryptographically identified instance
- Auditability: AgenticIDs serve as keys in the Merkle Tree audit structure, enabling efficient verification of any action in the session history
Technical Benefit — Cryptographic Agent Accountability: Unlike username-based or role-based agent identification, SHA-256/SHA-512 AgenticIDs are computationally infeasible to forge or impersonate. Each agent carries its own unforgeable identity credential, and the hash structure means any attempt to alter the agent's context or parentage produces a detectably different identity — invalidating its authorizations immediately.
3. OIDC PKCE and BFF: Secure Agentic Session Architecture
Agentic implementations leverage the Pulse OIDC framework through two proven patterns, both built on the PKCE authorization flow:
| SPA Pattern (PKCE) | BFF Pattern (PKCE + Secret) |
|---|---|
| Agent runs in a browser-based or client-side context | Agent runs server-side via Backend For Frontend architecture |
| PKCE code verifier/challenge prevents authorization code interception | PKCE combined with a client secret provides defense-in-depth |
| Access and refresh tokens managed within the agent process | Token management isolated from client-side exposure |
| Suitable for short-lived, user-proximate agentic tasks | Preferred for long-running or high-privilege agentic workflows |
| Shares ClientID with ClientMaster — authorization scope bounded by human session | Secret never exposed to client; BFF acts as trusted intermediary for the agent |
A critical architectural decision — shared ClientID — ensures that all agentic sessions are recognized within the same OIDC authorization domain as the originating human. This means:
- The OIDC provider can enforce session-level policies across the human and all their agents uniformly
- Token revocation at the ClientMaster level propagates to all agents sharing that ClientID
- Authorization scope granted to agents is always a subset of what the human ClientMaster holds — agents cannot self-elevate
4. Authorization via AuthZEN: Policy-Governed Agent Operations
Every agentic authorization request flows through the Pulse AuthZEN evaluation pipeline. This is not a separate agent-specific authorization system — it is the same trust-enriched evaluation that governs the human session, extended to agents:
- The agent sends an AuthZEN access evaluation request specifying subject (AgenticID + session context), action, and resource
- The PDP evaluates the request against current trust context, including the live trust scores from the human's Auth app
- Decisions are trust-enriched: permit, deny, permit-with-reduced-scope, or permit-pending-step-up
- Step-up is invoked inline by AuthZEN at the moment of evaluation — the PEP immediately pauses all affected agentic operations and pushes a step-up challenge to the human's Auth app. If the human completes the step-up challenge, operations resume. If the challenge is refused or times out, the relevant agent sessions terminate.
- All decisions are logged with AgenticID, timestamp, trust scores at time of evaluation, and the policy rule applied
Technical Benefit — Human Trust Flows Directly Into Agentic Decisions: When a human's proximity trust score drops — because they stepped away from their device — that signal flows immediately into every pending agentic authorization request. Agents requesting access to sensitive resources at that moment receive a degraded or denied decision, not the permit they would have received five minutes earlier. Authorization is always current, never stale.
Agentic Lifecycle Management
Agent Spawning: Clone vs. New Incarnation
Agentic instances authorized by the system may themselves spawn new agents, subject to policy. Two spawn models are supported, each with distinct authorization semantics:
| Clone Spawning | New Incarnation Spawning |
|---|---|
| New agent inherits parent's authorization scope | New agent receives no inherited authorizations |
| AgenticID computed from parent context — provenance chain preserved | AgenticID computed fresh — distinct from parent |
| No separate AuthZEN evaluation required at spawn time | Must complete full AuthZEN evaluation before any resource access |
| Authorization continuity: what parent can do, clone can do | Minimal-privilege by default: only what policy explicitly grants |
| Termination: clone terminates immediately and structurally when parent is revoked — cascade is not policy-dependent | New Merkle leaf, linked to parent by reference only |
| Use case: parallel execution of identical tasks | Use case: delegating to a specialized agent with different scope |
In both cases, the spawn operation itself is logged with the parent AgenticID, spawn type, timestamp, and the trust state of the human ClientMaster at time of spawn. This creates a complete genealogy of agent delegation for compliance and forensics.
Session Continuity Conditions
Agentic operations continue if and only if all three of the following conditions are simultaneously satisfied. Failure of any single condition triggers immediate suspension or termination of all affected agents:
| Condition 1 | Condition 2 | Condition 3 |
|---|---|---|
| Authorizations Granted — Current AuthZEN evaluation returns permit for the requested operation. Re-evaluated on each significant action. | ClientMaster Active — The human's OIDC session remains open. Termination of ClientMaster cascades immediately to all agents. | Human CA In Force — Continuous authentication of the originating human remains above configured thresholds. Trust degradation propagates in real time. |
Accountability and Monitoring: Merkle Tree Session Integrity
The Pulse Agentic Extension employs Merkle Tree methods to provide tamper-evident, continuously verifiable accountability across the entire agentic session hierarchy. This is not post-hoc logging — it is real-time integrity assurance embedded in the OIDC session domain.
How Merkle Tree Accountability Works
- Each significant agentic event — spawn, authorization request, resource access, trust score update, termination — is hashed and appended as a leaf node
- Leaf nodes are organized into a binary Merkle Tree where each parent node contains the hash of its two children
- The Merkle root hash represents the complete, tamper-evident state of all agentic activity in the session
- Any modification to any historical event invalidates the root hash and is detectable immediately
- The Merkle root is re-anchored on two triggers: on-demand during compliance queries (always producing a fresh verified root for audit), and at a configurable rate set by the Relying Party — allowing deployment-specific tuning of integrity assurance vs. overhead
| What Merkle Anchoring Provides | What It Detects |
|---|---|
| Proof that an agent's action history has not been altered retroactively | Retroactive modification of agent authorization records |
| Efficient verification of any single event without replaying the entire log | Injection of fraudulent agent activity into the session log |
| Cryptographic linkage of AgenticID hashes into an immutable action record | Tampering with spawn genealogy records |
| Compliance-ready audit trail aligned with NIST SP 800-207 continuous monitoring | Replay of expired agent tokens against current sessions |
| Splunk HEC-compatible log output for SIEM integration | Gaps in the event sequence that indicate suppressed log entries |
Continuous Session Monitoring Within the OIDC Domain
All Merkle Tree operations occur within the OIDC session domain — the same domain that governs the human's ClientMaster. This means:
- The OIDC provider, PDP, and PEP are all aware of both the human trust state and the agentic activity record simultaneously
- A policy decision that terminates the human session can reference the Merkle-anchored activity record to determine which agent actions to flag for review
- The session correlation ID ties the human's Auth app metric streams, the ClientMaster session, and every AgenticID into a single queryable record
- Incident response teams can reconstruct the complete chain of events — from human login through every agent action — using a single correlation ID
Technical Benefits Summary
| Benefit Area | Pulse Agentic Extension Capability |
|---|---|
| Human-Anchored Trust | All agentic authority derives from and is bounded by the continuous authentication state of the initiating human. No agent can hold greater trust than its originating human at any point in time. |
| Cryptographic Accountability | SHA-256/SHA-512 AgenticID hashes provide unforgeable, immutable agent identity. Every action is attributable to a specific, cryptographically identified instance with provable provenance. |
| Real-Time Trust Propagation | Live trust signal changes — proximity loss, behavioral anomaly, device compromise — propagate to agentic authorization decisions within milliseconds via PEP push notification. |
| Cascading Session Control | Termination of the human ClientMaster immediately suspends all subordinate agentic sessions. There is no orphaned agent problem — the human is structurally coupled to every agent they authorized. |
| Minimal-Privilege by Design | Agents can only hold authorizations explicitly granted through AuthZEN evaluation. New incarnation spawning starts with zero permissions. Clone spawning is bounded by parent scope. |
| Tamper-Evident Audit Trail | Merkle Tree methods provide cryptographic proof of activity record integrity. Any retroactive modification is detectable. Compliance reporting is anchored to verifiable, immutable session records. |
| OIDC/OAuth 2 Native | No proprietary agent management layer. The agentic extension is built entirely within OIDC/OAuth 2 semantics, leveraging PKCE, token scoping, and session management already present in the Pulse framework. |
| Standards Aligned | AuthZEN (OpenID Foundation), FIDO2/Passkey, Zero Trust Architecture (NIST SP 800-207), CMMC Level 2/3 access control and audit requirements all addressed through a single integrated framework. |
| Scalable Agent Hierarchy | Hierarchical AuthZEN evaluation supports multi-level agent chains. Sub-agent authorization is evaluated against the root human session trust state — degradation cascades through the entire hierarchy automatically. |
Resolved Design Decisions
The following architectural questions have been resolved and are incorporated into this document. They are recorded here for traceability between the design outline and the specification.
| Design Question | Decision |
|---|---|
| AgenticID hash context | Time-bounded session window is included in the AgenticID hash. The valid operational time range for the agent instance is baked into its identity at creation. Expired agents are cryptographically distinguishable from active ones without a separate revocation check. |
| Clone spawning: authorization inheritance on parent revocation | Children terminate immediately and structurally when their parent is revoked or terminated. There is no evaluation cycle delay — cascade is enforced at the session layer, not deferred to the next AuthZEN poll. |
| Step-up authentication for agentic workflows | AuthZEN invokes step-up inline at the point of evaluation. All affected agentic operations pause immediately. If the human completes the step-up challenge via their Auth app, operations resume. If refused or timed out, the relevant agent sessions terminate. |
| Merkle Tree anchoring frequency | Anchoring occurs on two triggers: (1) on-demand during compliance queries; and (2) at a configurable rate set by the Relying Party, allowing deployment-specific tuning of integrity vs. overhead. |
| AgenticID registry and discovery | AgenticIDs are registered in a discoverable agent registry within the OIDC domain. Registry scope, access controls, and privacy constraints are subject to further specification. |
Remaining Open Item — AgenticID Registry Specification: The decision to register AgenticIDs in a discoverable OIDC-domain registry is confirmed. The following aspects require further specification: access control model, privacy posture (whether registry entries are visible across ClientMaster boundaries), retention policy, and federation across OIDC providers.
Alignment with Existing Pulse Framework
The Agentic AI Extension is architecturally additive — it does not require modification of the core Pulse continuous authentication framework. All extension points use existing Pulse interfaces:
- ClientMaster sessions use the existing AffirmedID Connect OIDC provider with no protocol changes
- AgenticID hash generation and Merkle Tree operations are new services that consume existing session correlation IDs and OIDC token data
- AuthZEN evaluation for agents uses the same PDP evaluator endpoints already exposed for human session authorization
- PEP push notifications for agent suspension use the same callback registration mechanism already available to OIDC relying parties
- Audit log output is additive to the existing Splunk HEC pipeline — new AgenticID and Merkle root fields are appended to the existing session log schema
Implementation Readiness: The Pulse framework's existing investments in AuthZEN evaluation, PDP push notification, session correlation IDs, and OIDC/PKCE architecture provide a mature substrate for the Agentic AI Extension. The extension leverages — rather than replaces — these capabilities, minimizing integration risk and enabling phased rollout alongside existing Pulse deployments.
To learn more about the Pulse Agentic AI Extension — including integration architecture, AuthZEN evaluation endpoints, and deployment options — contact the AffirmedID team or explore the demo environment.
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